“Core Tips”
With more stores and longer menus, Luckin is looking for the next round of growth.
作者 | 張經緯
編輯 | 邢昀
How to eat more of the pie in a gradually shuffling market?
7-11 gave an answer. In the 1990s, the total number of convenience stores in Japan was approaching saturation and small and medium-sized brands were cleared out in batches. However, 7-11 did the opposite:Open stores at a high density in selected areas, use density to dilute logistics and supply chain costs, squeeze competitors out of the business district, and then take over the customers left by them.
The more the market shuffles, the more valuable the leader’s density advantage becomes. In 2026, China’s freshly brewed coffee market is facing a similar reshuffle, and market leader Luckin is also providing a similar solution.
On November 3, 2026, Luckin released its third quarter report: revenue in the first three quarters was 45.773 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 25%; the total number of stores reached 38,909. According to calculations by Huayuan Securities, with reference to the per capita disposable income of urban residents in 2024, Ruixing’s theoretical upper limit of opening stores in China is about 39,000. Ruixing CEO Guo Jinyi said at the third quarter earnings conference call that he is confident that he can maintain a competitive store opening pace.
In the early stages of the development of China’s fresh coffee market, Luckin played the role of market educator. When Luckin was listed on Nasdaq in May 2019, it told a story of potential and space: China’s per capita coffee consumption is only 6.2 cups, while the United States is 388 cups and Japan is 279 cups.
Nowadays, the potential is being realized in large quantities, and the top competitors are also constantly shuffling. Nowadays, as long as there is a coffee shop on the top of a scenic spot, Luckin, as a pioneer, is thinking of ways to further harvest the fruits of victory.
But it’s getting more and more difficult。
1. There are more stores, but the pressure on a single store is also greater.
“My store is operating well, but the payback period has also been extended to about two years.”
Luckin franchisee Liu Yang told Baobian.
Shortly after the epidemic began, he opened the first Luckin store near a local university. In the first few years since the store opened, business was relatively good, and “basically the money can be recovered within one year.” In the past two years, with the increase in surrounding stores, money has not been as easy to make as before. A new Lucky store opened near him, but it closed again soon after.
Similar feelings also appeared in the mouths of other interviewed franchisees, especially with the increase in stores and changes in the consumption environment. “It was very profitable at the beginning, but since it was encrypted, I have made less.”
The pressure felt by single store operators coincides with Luckin’s overall performance, which is still growing.。
On November 3, Luckin released its third quarter report for 2026. Revenue in the first three quarters was 45.773 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 25%, and net profit attributable to the parent company was 3.851 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 25%. Among them, the single-quarter revenue in the third quarter was 17.891 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 17.0%, and the net profit was 1.859 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 45.4%.
In the first three quarters, Luckin added a net of 7,861 stores, the most in the same period since its establishment. Among them, the number of self-operated stores increased from 20,234 to 25,402, an increase of 5,168; the number of joint-venture (franchised) stores increased from 10,814 to 13,507, an increase of 2,693.
The growth of stores has become the driving force behind Luckin’s performance growth.
However, it can be seen that the same-store sales of self-operated stores have experienced negative growth for three consecutive quarters, and the decline has expanded quarter by quarter. By Q3 2026, this indicator will decline 11.1% year-on-year.
The performance of joint-venture stores is actually more complex.
Financial report data shows that Luckin Coffee’s joint store revenue in the third quarter of 2026 was 4.243 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 11.7%.
Unlike most franchise brands in the industry, which mainly charge a large fixed franchise fee, Luckin does not charge a franchise fee in addition to equipment fees and material fees. It mainly takes 10% to 40% of the gross profit based on the tiered payment amount. This can be understood as a kind of bundling that advances and retreats with the franchisees.
This 11.7% growth is the growth of revenue collected by Ruixing from franchisees.
Let’s look at it together with another piece of data. During the same period, the number of joint-venture stores increased by 30.7% year-on-year, and the expansion rate was significantly faster than the revenue growth rate. This shows thatMore and more stores are opened, but the revenue has not kept pace. On average, the output of each franchise store is actually diluted.
On the one hand, the company’s revenue and profits are growing, and on the other hand, the pressure on individual stores is increasing.
For Luckin, which already has nearly 40,000 stores, how much increment can be brought by continued expansion and how it will affect existing stores is becoming a more important issue.
2. From selling coffee to selling sugar water, a store strives for more business
Luckin is also trying to make each store reach more consumers and obtain more orders. It sells light milk tea and Thai milk, and now Luckin is trying to put Chinese sugar water on the menu.
“I have the habit of drinking specialty coffee, and I know that real coffee drinkers will not drink so sweet. It basically solves the refreshing needs of milk tea customers.” Liu Yang has been deeply involved in the tea industry for many years, and has opened multiple tea/coffee brand chain stores before. He believes that compared with tea brands that grew up in the same period, Luckin’s advantages have little to do with category, and are mainly about price and cost control.
“In prefecture-level cities like ours in non-coastal provinces, high-end tea brands cannot sink, and specialty coffee cannot be repurchased for long-term consumption. It is easier for Luckin to survive.”
In the past two years, Luckin has taken a big step forward on this basis and promoted non-coffee drinks on a large scale. In June 2024, Luckin launched light coffee lemon tea, and then intensively launched light milk tea, fruit tea, ice milk, yogurt shake, Thai milk, etc. As of the end of the second quarter of 2026, Luckin has 25 products with cumulative sales exceeding 100 million cups, 5 of which are non-coffee products. The Thai milk launched in the third quarter also sold more than 13 million cups in the first week of its launch.
In November 2026, Luckin expanded its menu to Chinese-style sugar water and launched tapioca and peach gum stewed milk. Liu Yang feels that there is not much difference between a coffee shop and a tea shop. “At most, tea drinks take longer to sell in a day.”
Coffee orders are concentrated in the morning and noon peaks, while the demand for tea extends to afternoon tea and evening. The addition of non-coffee drinks to the menu provides a way to gain growth for Luckin, whose store density is constantly increasing:This allows existing stores to receive more consumer demand, while also extending the store’s effective business hours.
Reverse osmosis is also happening. As of the end of June 2026, more than 90% of Guming’s stores are equipped with coffee machines. Among the 51 new products launched in the first half of the year, 12 are coffee products; Hushang Auntie and Mixue Bingcheng have already launched coffee sub-brands Huka and Lucky Coffee.
When coffee shops sell tea and tea shops sell coffee, competition between brands becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate based on category alone.New product development, procurement costs, store execution and other capabilities have begun to affect operating results more directly.
This is also the reason why some franchisees choose Luckin.
“I chose Luckin at that time mainly because their new product development was faster and their store management was clearer. Franchisees only needed to implement it,” said franchisee Guo Long.
Clear management also means stricter requirements.
A franchisee revealed to Baobian that Ruixing has extremely strict management of franchise stores. “No banners are allowed when opening, otherwise you will be fined by the headquarters.” Liu Yang said. In terms of personnel, they must undergo strict training. “Each store must have a store manager who has been trained by the headquarters. The store manager qualifications must pass the examination and be required to lead the store for more than three months.” Guo Long told Baobian.
For franchisees, joining Luckin means receiving a relatively mature set of products and operational support, while accepting management from the headquarters. For the headquarters, the larger the store, the more standardization is needed to implement new products and operating requirements into stores in different regions.
The menu can quickly grow longer, but whether new products can generate continuous repurchases and bring sufficient increases determines the extent to which it can alleviate the pressure on single stores.
3. Continue to encrypt, how much more space can Ruixing open?
The early days of Luckin’s expansion were the happiest times for Chinese tea/coffee franchisees: demand expanded rapidly, competitors were limited, and the payback cycle was measured in months, and Liu Yang also enjoyed that wave of dividends.
During that period, people with poor information seized the opportunity first.
When Luckin opened its doors to franchises, quite a few franchisees were internal employees of directly-operated stores and people from Fujian. “Employees know store data relatively well, and Luckin is headquartered in Xiamen, so the locals are well-informed. It is easier for these two groups of people to discover at an early stage that there is profit in opening Luckin.” Franchisee Guo Long understands this phenomenon this way.
After Ruixing’s large-scale expansion in 2021, the recruitment of partners was suspended in August 2022, and was not reopened until December; by around the summer of 2023, Ruixing once again stopped joining county stores in some provinces.
This gives competitors an opportunity. After Kudi Coffee was established at the end of 2022, it quickly launched a price war, and at the same time quickly spread to counties with low-threshold joint ventures. The window period during which Luckin suspended county franchises coincided with Cudi’s advancement in the county market.
By October 2024, the number of Kudi stores exceeded 10,000, and then the goal of opening 50,000 stores by the end of 2025 was proposed. According to data from Narrow Door Restaurant in March 2025, Kudi’s stores in third-tier cities and below accounted for 38.24%, and the degree of sinking is higher than Luckin’s 33.19%.
Perhaps feeling the pressure, Luckin has also carried out substantial expansion and continued to encrypt stores. In 2025, the number of Luckin directly-operated stores and franchised stores will increase by 8,708, totaling more than 30,000. This idea will continue in 2026. In the first three quarters, the number of stores increased by 7,861, totaling approximately 39,000.
豹變制圖
The so-called “encryption” refers to increasing store density within a certain range. Most of Luckin’s directly-operated stores are located in first- and second-tier cities, and its rapid growth means an increase in store density within a certain range.
But from Luckin’s financial report, we can see that in addition to the period when the food delivery war is heating up,Years when stores are added on a large scale are also accompanied by a decline in the revenue of old stores.
豹變制圖
By around 2023, as store density increases, return on investment will slow down. But franchisees basically believe that the headquarters must make money.
“Ruixing is a data-oriented company, and they must make good calculations before opening new stores. If it is encrypted, it means that they calculated that the number of original stores cannot support the current order volume. The revenue of a single store may be reduced, but the overall calculation will definitely make money.” Guo Long told Baobian.
但The total growth brought about by the increase in stores may not be reflected in the profits of each store in equal proportions.. Whether a new store can contribute to the increase needs to be observed in the region as a whole; but for existing stores, the more direct test is how many orders it can retain and how long it will take to recoup its investment.
For franchisees, judging whether an investment is worthwhile ultimately depends on the specific business district, daily order volume and cost structure.
How big the encryption space is, the outside world doesn’t know Luckin’s answer. But outside of stores, Luckin is also looking for new growth points, such as coffee retail.
At present, the company’s pre-packaged brand “Luckin Instant” covers coffee liquid, bottled ready-to-drink, instant coffee, coffee beans, capsules, hanging ears and other categories. In late August 2026, the official announcement of coffee liquid exceeded 1 billion cups. In the financial statements, this part of the business is included in “other products” revenue: 1.052 billion yuan in the third quarter of 2026, a year-on-year increase of approximately 69%, and its proportion of total net revenue increased from 4.1% in the same period last year to 5.9%.
The story of 7-11 shows that when the market is reshuffled, players with high store density and strict management are more likely to survive until the end. Luckin has applied this logic to coffee/tea drinks. As a result, when competitors Cudi and Lucky Coffee were shrinking,
Luckin still relies on store expansion to increase revenue and profits.
But it remains to be seen whether the ceiling is as optimistic as Guo Jinyi expected.
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