Two accounts of Chinese and foreign car companies

The profits of Chinese auto companies are being squeezed by both upstream and price wars. The book advantages of multinational auto companies come more from financial exchange and high-profit models, rather than from overall leadership in the main automobile business.

Article | Yang Zheng, special writer of “Finance”

Editor | Zhao Cheng

First-half performance reports of domestic and foreign listed car companies have been released one after another.

In the domestic market, 15 major listed vehicle companies in the passenger car field had a total operating income of 1.43866 billion yuan in the first half of the year, a total net profit attributable to parent companies of 21.80 billion yuan, and a net profit margin of 1.52%. This data is basically consistent with the calculation by Chen Shihua, deputy secretary-general of the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers. Chen Shihua previously stated at an industry event that the average profit margin of the vehicle manufacturing process will drop to 1.5% in the first half of 2026, a year-on-year decrease of 43%, the lowest in the past decade.

The main reason for the sharp decline in profit margins is rising costs. Leaders of many car companies such as Cyrus (601127.SH), Ideal (02015.HK), and Weilai (09866.HK) have publicly admitted that the rising prices of core components such as batteries and chips have brought greater cost pressure to the companies. In addition, fierce market competition in the first half of the year forced car companies to significantly reduce prices and promote sales, which also compressed car company profits on the revenue side. According to data from the Passenger Car Market Information Joint Branch of the China Automobile Dealers Association (Passenger Car Association Branch), in the first half of the year, the price reduction of new energy vehicles reached 12%, the price reduction of new conventional fuel vehicles reached 14.1%, and the price reduction of new cars in the overall passenger car market reached 12.6%.

Globally, differentiation remains evident. During the same period, 12 major multinational car companies achieved net profits attributable to their parent companies equivalent to approximately RMB 247.3 billion, with an average net profit margin of 3.91%. Toyota (7203.T) only achieved a net profit attributable to its parent company of approximately RMB 72.37 billion in the first quarter of this fiscal year, from April to June 2026, which is about 6 times that of BYD (002594.SZ), the most profitable Chinese car company, and more than the combined profits of all 15 listed Chinese car companies.

However, the traditional narrative that one Toyota’s profits top all Chinese car companies does not fully apply to today’s global automotive industry trends. In fact, Toyota’s profits largely come from finance and exchange. If you further dismantle the financial reports of these multinational car companies, it is not difficult to see that there is a complex accounting behind the profits of each car company. Electrification, tariffs, supply chains, and even challenges in the Chinese market are all eroding the profits of these car companies to varying degrees.

In short, Chinese car companies are working hard to maintain and improve profitability, and multinational car companies are not making easy money and are also facing uncertainty. From the perspective of the global automotive industry, transformation challenges are universal, and local car companies and multinational giants are no exception.

Who took the profits?

For Chinese car companies, the most direct reason for pressure on profits is the upstream supply chain.

The financial report data of CATL (300750.SZ) shows that the company’s operating income in the first half of the year was 276.917 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 54.80%, and the net profit attributable to the parent company reached 43.284 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 41.98%. This profit scale exceeds that of BYD, Geely Automobile (0175.HK), Chery Automobile (09973.HK), SAIC Motor (600104.SH), and Great Wall Motor (601633.SH) combined. The profit of a battery company is more than 5 billion yuan more than the five major car companies combined.

Moreover, the situation in the CATL era is not an exception. During the same period, Tianqi Lithium (002466.SZ) recorded a net profit attributable to the parent company of 4.242 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of approximately 49 times, with a gross profit margin of 64.39%. The company admitted frankly that the surge in profits was mainly due to the increase in the average sales price of lithium products and the increase in sales of lithium compounds and derivatives compared with the same period last year.

Market data shows that the average spot price of battery-grade lithium carbonate in the first half of this year was about 163,400 yuan/ton, an increase of about 93,000 yuan/ton from the average price of about 70,400 yuan/ton in the first half of 2025, an increase of more than 130%. According to calculations by CITIC Securities, if the charge of the bicycle remains unchanged, for every 10,000 yuan/ton increase in the price of lithium carbonate, the cost of the bicycle will increase by 318 yuan.

The rise in costs doesn’t stop there. Automotive-grade memory chips have seen even steeper growth. From April to June this year, the overall price of automotive-grade memory chips increased by approximately 180%. In terms of raw materials, aluminum prices exceeded 25,000 yuan/ton at the beginning of this year, and copper prices stood at 100,000 yuan/ton.

CITIC Securities issued a warning at the beginning of this year. It is expected that the battery end will push up the average bicycle cost by about 3,000 yuan in 2026. The increase in copper and aluminum prices may cause the average bicycle cost to increase by about 2,000 yuan. The increase in storage prices will have a lower impact, but it is expected to have a rigid impact on the cost of bicycles throughout the year.

The calculations made by the car companies themselves are more specific.

Zhang Xinghai, chairman of Cyrus, said at an industry forum in June this year that the prices of lithium carbonate and memory chips have increased significantly compared with the same period last year, pushing the average cost of Wenjie bicycles to increase by 15,000 yuan to 20,000 yuan. Qu Yu, chief financial officer of NIO, said at the earnings conference call that the cost of bicycles has increased by about 14,000 yuan in the second quarter compared with the end of last year, and is expected to increase by another 2,000 yuan to 3,000 yuan in the second half of the year. He Xiaopeng, chairman of Xpeng, concluded that most of the money saved by car companies through technological innovation is returned to partners who operate businesses such as memory and lithium carbonate.

Meanwhile, at the other end of the value chain, new car prices fell instead of rising.

Data from the China Passenger Car Association shows that in the first half of the year, the price reduction of new energy vehicles reached 12%, the price reduction of new conventional fuel vehicles reached 14.1%, and the price reduction of new cars in the overall passenger car market reached 12.6%. Cui Dongshu, secretary-general of the China Passenger Car Association, pointed out that from the perspective of the overall auto market structure, price levels and cost pressures are in an inverted form, that is, high-end car companies have relatively sufficient profit margins, gross profit margins are generally maintained at more than 20%, and there is no demand for active price adjustments; on the contrary, mid- to low-end products are facing continued intensification of industry competition and gradual shrinking of market capacity. Such products are less likely to have large-scale price increases and are under greater cost pressure.

In addition, while Chinese car companies are actively exploring overseas markets and optimizing their revenue structure, they are also facing exchange risks. Guoyuan Securities pointed out that the growth of overseas operations and exchange results are often out of sync, and the expansion of overseas income may also be accompanied by losses. US dollar and euro accounts receivable formed by export receivables will generate conversion losses during the RMB appreciation stage, and the time difference between revenue recognition and collection settlement will amplify the exposure. Through overseas procurement, foreign currency borrowing and overseas production, companies can form natural hedges, but when the currency structure does not match, financial expenses will still increase.

Judging from the disclosed financial reports, exchange risks have a particularly concentrated impact on several auto companies that go global quickly. Changan Automobile recorded a net exchange loss of approximately 230 million yuan in the first half of the year, compared with a net exchange income of 1.356 billion yuan in the same period last year. Superimposed on the shrinkage of interest income, financial expenses suddenly increased from -1.957 billion yuan in the previous period to 69 million yuan in the current period, with a difference of approximately 2.026 billion yuan between one entry and one out. Great Wall Motor’s approximately 4 billion yuan in overseas subsidy income delays and exchange losses directly dragged down its net profit in the first half of the year. Chery Automobile’s net exchange loss was 2.092 billion yuan, compared with a net exchange gain of 3.398 billion yuan in the same period last year. These data show that overseas expansion is not cost-free, and exchange rate risk management capabilities are becoming an important dimension to measure the quality of internationalization of automobile companies.

Industry insiders pointed out that except for companies such as BYD that have full industry chain capabilities in some fields, the vast majority of car companies lack pricing power in areas such as batteries and chips, and can only choose to bear the pressure in this round of rising costs. The fierce market competition has greatly squeezed out the space to cover costs through price increases, and exchange risks have exploded intensively in the first half of the year. The result is that car companies have paid the price of profits.

The gap is not just in the income statement

According to “Finance” statistics, 15 listed vehicle companies achieved a total net profit attributable to parent companies of 21.8 billion yuan in the first half of the year, operating income of 1.43866 billion yuan, and a net profit rate of 1.52%. During the same period, the net profit attributable to the parent company of 12 major multinational auto companies was equivalent to approximately RMB 247.3 billion, with operating income of RMB 6,319.6 billion and a net profit margin of 3.91%.

The gap between the two is not only about an 11-fold difference in profit scale, but also a difference in profit structure. The familiar traditional narrative that Toyota’s profits top all Chinese car companies continues to hold true. In the first quarter of this fiscal year alone, from April to June 2026, Toyota’s net profit attributable to its parent company reached approximately RMB 72.37 billion, which is about 6 times that of BYD, China’s most profitable car company, and more than the combined profits of all 15 listed Chinese car companies. The net profits of other car companies such as Volkswagen (VOW3.DE), General Motors (GM.US), Mercedes-Benz (MBG.DE), BMW (BMW.DE), and Hyundai (005380.KS) in the first half of the year were also close to or even exceeded 20 billion yuan. Whether it is the scale or quality of profits, the overall gap between Chinese car companies and multinational car companies is obvious.

The profitability of multinational car companies is indeed stronger, which is supported by many factors.

The first is pricing initiative. China and the United States are the two largest automobile markets in the world. While Chinese car companies are locked in fierce competition in the domestic market, multinational car companies are also facing pressure from high U.S. tariffs. The difference is that multinational car companies pass costs to downstream, while Chinese car companies can only absorb them themselves.

A report released by Cox Automotive, a U.S. auto industry consulting organization, in March this year showed that the auto-related tariffs implemented by the United States in the past year have brought about $30 billion in additional costs to the U.S. auto industry, which is almost directly reflected in vehicle prices. The price of imported bicycles increased by US$5,000 to US$8,900, while the price of locally assembled models increased by US$1,600 to US$2,000 due to steel and aluminum taxes. It is understood that on June 30 this year, the average transaction price of new cars in the United States was US$51,974, an increase of US$314 month-on-month and US$2,421 year-on-year. Pass-through isn’t just done through price tags. Cox Automotive’s report pointed out that the average manufacturer’s suggested retail price in the United States increased by 10.4%, of which 4.5% was absorbed by dealers and 5.9% was actually borne by consumers.

In contrast, in the Chinese market, the price of fuel vehicles dropped by 14.1% in the first half of the year, and the price of new energy vehicles dropped by 12%. The gap in profitability widened.

Secondly, there is the basic market composed of high-profit models. The financial report shows that in the first half of the year, General Motors’ North American division contributed 87% of the company’s adjusted profits. Against the backdrop of a 3.6% year-on-year sales decline in the U.S. auto industry in the first half of the year, GM relied on profit pillar products such as full-size pickup trucks and large SUVs to achieve an adjusted EBIT of US$7.1 billion. Ford (F.US)’s profit margin in the first half of the year was 10.5%. Based on this, both companies raised their full-year profit guidance in the first half. Honda (7267.T) relies more on its motorcycle business for its profits. In the first quarter of this fiscal year, from April to June, it achieved an operating profit of 234 billion yen, accounting for 44% of the company’s operating profit. The profit margin is as high as 20.5%. The scale and quality of profits are better than those of the automobile business.

In addition, there is feedback from the comprehensive business layout in multiple fields. In the first half of the year, Mercedes-Benz Financial Services’ adjusted profit before interest and tax was 492 million euros, a year-on-year increase of 70%. The adjusted sales return rate of the commercial vehicle business was 10.2%, both higher than the 4% adjusted sales profit margin of its passenger car business. At a time when the passenger car business is under pressure, other high-profit segments have assumed a buffering role within the group.

The profitability advantage of multinational car companies is real. It comes from stronger pricing initiative, more optimized product structure and more balanced business portfolio.

There are also differences in earnings quality within Chinese auto companies. Jianghuai Automobile (600418.SH)’s net profit attributable to the parent company in the first half of the year was a loss of 750 million yuan, and the loss after deducting non-net profits expanded to 991 million yuan. It has been losing money for nine consecutive years since 2017. Its associate company Volkswagen Anhui suffered a net loss of 2.310 billion yuan in the first half of the year, and its cumulative losses since its establishment exceeded 13.8 billion yuan. JAC’s investment losses recognized under the equity method were approximately 578 million yuan, accounting for 77% of JAC’s net loss attributable to its parent company in the first half of the year. Li Auto’s overall gross profit margin in the first half of the year dropped sharply to 9.5% from 20.3% in the same period in 2025, and its vehicle sales business gross profit margin dropped from 19.6% to 7.8%, with a net loss of 3.98 billion yuan, compared with a net profit of 1.74 billion yuan in the same period a year ago. These cases show that the profit gap is not only between multinational and Chinese car companies, but also accelerating differentiation within Chinese car companies.

Earning a lot may not mean making a stable income

However, leadership in profitability does not mean peace of mind in operational quality. In fact, the semi-annual reports of some multinational car companies also contain elements of beautification.

The reason Toyota was able to achieve such high profits in a single quarter largely came from finance and exchange. Toyota achieved a net profit attributable to the parent company of 1.48 trillion yen from April to June 2026, a year-on-year increase of approximately 76%. However, the operating profit of the automobile business was 719.9 billion yen, a year-on-year decrease of 21%. The operating profit margin of the automobile business segment fell to 5.99% from 8.26% in the same period last year. The group operating profit was 1.06 trillion yen, a year-on-year decrease of 8.8%. This was the fifth consecutive quarter of decline. This is a typical example of a company with good-looking accounts but declining main business.

Toyota’s growth comes more from non-main business factors. The financial report shows that Toyota’s other financial income jumped to 850.5 billion yen from 153.7 billion yen in the same period last year. At the same time, exchange gains and losses turned from a loss of 212.3 billion yen in the same period last year to a profit of 112.3 billion yen. These two changes alone contributed more than 1 trillion yen to the profit increase. The impact of exchange factors on Toyota’s performance is exactly the opposite of its impact on Chinese car companies, reflecting the two sides of exchange rate fluctuations in the context of globalization.

Further dismantling the financial reports of these multinational car companies, it is not difficult to see that there is a complicated accounting behind each company’s profits. Electrification, tariffs, supply chains, and even challenges in the Chinese market are all eroding their profits to varying degrees.

Electrification is the primary challenge faced by many multinational car companies.

In Germany, the sales of new energy products of the three major car companies Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz and BMW are growing, but the development trend is still unclear and there may even be a retracement. Mercedes-Benz sold 103,000 pure electric vehicles in the first half of the year, a year-on-year increase of 45%, but during the same period, plug-in hybrid sales were 58,600 units, a year-on-year decrease of 34%. The situation at Volkswagen is exactly the opposite. Sales of pure electric models fell by 5.8% year-on-year while plug-in hybrid models increased by 27%. BMW’s pure electric model sales in the European market increased by 37.9% in the second quarter, but the group’s global pure electric model delivery still fell by 7.4%. Industry insiders pointed out that the increase or decrease in sales of German new energy vehicles is closely related to the technical direction and rhythm of the launch of their respective new models. This complex sales trend reflects that German car companies have not yet determined a long-term development path in the field of new energy vehicles that suits their respective characteristics.

The impact of electrification transformation on the performance of U.S. auto companies is directly written on their books. General Motors incurred strategic adjustment expenditures of US$3.455 billion in the first half of the year, of which electric-related expenses accounted for US$2.279 billion. Ford’s single-quarter net loss in the second quarter was US$1.327 billion. The important reason was that the dissolution of one of its battery joint ventures resulted in a one-time charge of US$3.6 billion. Ford also formally dissolved the Model e division responsible for the electric vehicle business in April. Relevant data shows that the division’s cumulative losses in the five years of independent operation exceeded US$12.8 billion. Some organizations estimate that the world’s major auto companies have recognized a total of approximately US$55 billion in expenses due to reductions in electric vehicle plans, adjustments to product portfolios, and impairment of related assets.

After recording its first annual net loss since the company went public in fiscal 2025, Honda has admitted that the goal of full electrification in 2040 is unrealistic, and has significantly lowered its global pure electric vehicle sales target in 2030 from the previous 2 million units to 700,000 to 750,000 vehicles. The main reason for this loss was the impairment of electric vehicle business assets of approximately 1.58 trillion yen in the current period.

Another common variable is the Chinese market. In the first half of the year, Volkswagen’s equity method operating profit contribution from Chinese joint ventures fell from 506 million euros to 184 million euros, a decrease of 63.6%. Profit contributed by Audi’s China business fell from 279 million euros to 73 million euros, a decrease of 74%. Mercedes-Benz’s revenue in the Chinese market was 7.01 billion euros, a year-on-year decrease of 19.1%. BMW did not separately list revenue or profits from the Chinese market in its financial report, but it delivered 261,800 vehicles in China in the first half of the year, a year-on-year decrease of 20.4%. In the second quarter, the decline expanded to 30.2%. As for Japanese car companies, Honda sold 205,800 units in China, down 34.7%, Toyota sold 694,700 units, down 17.1%, and Nissan produced 237,000 units, down 15%. According to data from the China Passenger Car Association, the cumulative share of independent brands in the first half of the year reached 71.8%, while the total share of foreign car companies only remained at 28.2%.

Chinese car companies also face structural problems. Great Wall Motor’s sales of new energy vehicles in the first half of the year were 144,600 units, a year-on-year decrease of 9.8%. The penetration rate of new energy vehicles was approximately 24.8%, which was significantly different from the industry penetration rate of 49.6%. Calculated based on the interim report and annual report, this is the first time that Great Wall Motors’ new energy vehicle sales have declined since 2023. Chery Automobile’s domestic revenue was 44.312 billion yuan, down 41.7% year-on-year. Domestic retail sales were approximately 412,800 units, down 36.4% year-on-year, which was higher than the industry’s overall decline of 20.2%. The monthly sales of Li Auto’s pure electric i8 have dropped from the peak of more than 6,700 units at the end of last year to the level of 1,000 to 2,000 units. The i series has not yet proven its ability to generate blood. These data show that Chinese car companies are also under structural pressure in the new energy and domestic markets.

Two accounts, two difficulties

An in-depth analysis of the two sets of Chinese and foreign ledgers shows that both Chinese and foreign car companies are looking for new certainties amid their respective uncertainties.

What Chinese companies need to answer is whether they can get back their profits after being divided upstream and in price wars.

Going overseas is currently the most certain increase. In the first half of the year, BYD’s overseas revenue was 181.3 billion yuan, accounting for 53% of total revenue. Chery exported 939,000 vehicles, accounting for 74% of its sales. Great Wall Motors’ overseas sales in the first half of the year were 289,000 units, accounting for nearly 50%. Geely exported 474,000 vehicles, a year-on-year increase of 158%. Among them, BYD achieved overseas revenue accounting for 52.57% of total revenue with overseas sales accounting for 43.8% of total sales, demonstrating higher profitability in overseas markets.

Judging from the disclosed financial reports, the increase in overseas expansion is not without costs. In the first half of the year, Chery recorded a net exchange loss of 2.092 billion yuan. Geely’s net exchange income increased from 2.64 billion yuan in the same period last year to a net loss of 550 million yuan. Great Wall recorded a loss of approximately 266 million yuan after excluding exchange lock hedging. Changan Automobile suffered an exchange loss of approximately 230 million yuan. As the proportion of overseas revenue increases, exchange rate risk exposure increases simultaneously, and investment in overseas channels and localization is also in the early stages. Going overseas is an increase, but the quality of the increase depends on market dispersion and local operation capabilities.

Moreover, the benefits of overseas expansion are not equal to all car companies. The revenue of Great Wall Motors’ Russian subsidiary in the first half of the year was 20.81 billion yuan, accounting for 20.4% of its total revenue, and its net profit was 1.047 billion yuan, accounting for about 40% of its net profit attributable to the parent company in the first half of the year. The concentration in a single market is high. Chery Automobile’s overseas revenue accounted for 69.1% of total revenue, while domestic revenue fell 41.7% year-on-year. The structural imbalance of strong overseas revenue and weak domestic revenue is obvious. Li Auto’s overseas markets are still in the investment stage and its short-term contribution to revenue will be limited. Going overseas is incremental, but the quality and sustainability of the incremental growth depend on market dispersion and local operation capabilities.

There is also great potential for high-end development. In the first half of the year, Geely’s high-end brand Ji Krypton sold 178,000 vehicles, accounting for 12.5% ​​of the group, but contributed 31.7% of revenue, with an average unit price of about 350,000 yuan. BYD’s three high-end brands, Fangbao, Denza and Yangwang, sold a total of 228,000 vehicles in the first half of the year, a year-on-year increase of 61%. Their proportion of total sales increased from less than 8% in the same period last year to 12.6%. Among them, Denza’s sales in June exceeded 20,000 vehicles for the first time, and the average product price reached 360,000 yuan. Data from the China Passenger Car Association Branch shows that in the first half of the year, the market share of independent brands above 400,000 yuan reached 59%, an increase of 21 percentage points compared with the same period in 2025.

But premiumization is also not a story that all car companies can fulfill. The monthly sales of the Zunjie S800 under JAC Motors fell from a high of 4,223 units to 367 units. The Zunjie Super Factory has a designed annual production capacity of 200,000 units. As of the first half of 2026, it has delivered only 19,000 units. The capacity utilization rate is less than 10%, and the amortization cost of a single vehicle is high. Sales of Great Wall Motor’s Wei brand V9X have been climbing slowly since its launch, with monthly sales of 1,018 units in May, 1,505 units in June, and a total of 4,378 units in July. It is still far from the over 10,000 orders announced in the first month of its launch. The combined sales volume of Chery Automobile’s two high-end brands, Xingtu and Zhijie, accounted for only about 4% of the group’s total sales, which marked a substantial setback in its pursuit of high-end products. These cases illustrate that high average prices do not equal high profits. It still takes scale and time to transform high-end products from product pricing to report profits.

However, it should be noted that although the current high-end models of Chinese brands can achieve higher average product prices and even higher gross profit margins, the scale of high-end models is still relatively small and it is difficult to dilute costs. Therefore, it will take time to convert high unit prices into high profits in performance reports.

In addition, the expense side of Chinese car companies is also worthy of attention. In the first half of the year, many car companies continued to increase investment in research and development, sales channel construction and intelligence. High R&D investment is long-term and uncertain, and it is difficult to quickly convert it into profits in the short term. Zhang Yongwei, chairman of the Auto Baihui Research Institute, pointed out that vehicle companies are under the triple pressure of rising prices of upstream raw materials, high R&D investment in intelligent transformation, and market competition for profits, and profit margins are being continuously compressed. The combination of these factors means that the profit recovery path of Chinese auto companies is more complicated than simple cost reduction.

What multinational car companies have to answer is whether the current strategy can be sustained.

In the face of cost rigidity in Europe, German car companies still need to clarify the long-term direction of electrification transformation and how long the investment period will be. The recent news of factory closures, layoffs, and postponement of bonuses reminds people that German car companies do not have much time left. The question for American car companies is how long they can maintain the moat of local high-profit models. Japanese car companies will have to face the situation after the exchange rate dividend expires, and more importantly, the long-term impact of delayed product cycles and technical reserves after the withdrawal of pure electric models.

Among the 15 sample car companies, profit differentiation is increasing. There are companies such as BYD and Geely that rely on scale and overseas expansion to maintain profits, and there are also many car companies whose profits have shrunk significantly due to exchange, price wars and transformation investments. The profit recovery of Chinese car companies is not a unified curve, but a scattered breakthrough in which each one is looking for a way out.

To measure the progress of this transformation, we may focus on three indicators: first, whether the overseas business of Chinese car companies can achieve stable net profit per vehicle despite tariffs and exchange rate fluctuations; second, whether the sales volume of high-end brands can cross the critical point of diluting costs; third, in core links such as batteries and chips, whether the proportion of self-developed and self-made or locked in long-term agreements by car companies can substantially improve bargaining power.

There is no doubt that the profit gap between Chinese and foreign car companies is real, but what should be noted is that outside of this traditional narrative, the performance of Chinese car companies should not be summarized as simply not making money. Although Chinese car companies are struggling to find a path amid the double squeeze of costs and prices, multinational giants also need to recalibrate their course amid the ebbing tide of electrification and market restructuring. Behind the gap on the books is the collision of two industrial logics and the pace of transformation. Whether it is taking back profits or defending the moat, the second half of the global automotive industry will not only test scale and speed, but also the control of the value chain and strategic determination. Whoever can take the lead in establishing new certainty amid uncertainty will define the competitive landscape for the next decade.

Explanation of sample and caliber: The 15 Chinese listed vehicle companies counted in this article are A-share and Hong Kong-listed companies with large-scale businesses in the passenger car market. The statistical period is from January 1 to June 30, 2026. The financial data of 12 major multinational car companies are taken from their respective financial reports. The statistical range is based on the fiscal year of each company. For Toyota and Honda, it is from April to June 2026, and for most of the others, it is from January to June 2026. The net profits of multinational auto companies are converted into RMB based on the exchange rate on the date of financial report disclosure. Due to differences in Chinese and foreign accounting standards, fiscal year arrangements and exchange rate conversion dates.

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